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Abstract 
Australia and New Zealand have agreed in principle to the creation of a single agency for the 
regulation of pharmaceuticals and other therapeutic products in a trans-Tasman market.  The 
Australia New Zealand Therapeutic Products Authority (“ANZTPA”) is being developed to 
replace both the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration (“TGA”) and the NZ 
Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Authority (“Medsafe”). This article explores the 
possibility that the ANZTPA, by inheriting significant obligations imposed on the TGA under 
the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (“AUSFTA”), may significantly impact 
upon the regulation of medicines and medical devices (as well as blood products) in New 
Zealand. It explores the related legal obligations and their likely consequences for New 
Zealand, particularly quality, safety and efficacy and cost-effectiveness evaluation processes 
in this area, such as those of The New Zealand Pharmaceutical Management Agency 
(“Pharmac”).  
Introduction 
The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (“AUSFTA”) entered into force on 
1 January 2005.3 The negotiation of AUSFTA provisions (in Annex 2C and related side 
letters) requiring alterations (particularly in the name of transparency and recognition of 
innovation) to Australia’s internationally respected medicines cost-effectiveness pricing 
system, known as the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (“PBS”), was a major concession to 
the US brand-name pharmaceutical industry. Its representative organ the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers Association (“PhRMA”), through the office of the US Trade 
Representative (“USTR”) had aggressively lobbied for and obtained a legislative mandate 
requiring US trade negotiators to seek the “elimination” of such scientific pharmaceutical 
price evaluation structures.4 Yet, it was not so much PBS government reimbursement that the 
                                                
3 Australian Government, Department of Foreign affairs and Trade. 2004, Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement. Full text, reports, fact sheets, etc., Available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us.html 
4 Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act 2003 21 U.S.C conference agreement. Trade 
Act 2002 (US), 107-210 §2102 (b) (8) (D) 
6 FaunceT, Doran E, Henry D, Drahos P, Searles P, Pekarsky B, Neville, W. “Assessing the impact of the 
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement on Australian and global medicines policy” Globalisation and 
Health 2005: 1; 1-15 
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US pharmaceutical industry was targeting, as the scientific cost-effectiveness evaluations 
performed by the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (“PBAC”). Picking up on 
these obligations, Annex 2C of the AUSFTA also included provisions requiring Australia’s 
Therapeutic Goods Administration to initiate discussions with the US Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) about making “innovative” products more speedily available (Annex 
2C.4). 
Chapter 17 of the AUSFTA (Intellectual Property) additionally contained a provision 
(article 17.10.4) requiring the Australian TGA to “prevent” marketing approval for a generic 
medicine whenever a patent (of any type) was “claimed” over the original product. Concerns 
about the resultant amendments to the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) facilitating 
“evergreening” of soon to expire patents, lead to the passing of specific anti-evergreening 
legislation by the Australian parliament.6  
This article explores the question of whether the proposed joint scheme between 
Australia and New Zealand for the regulation of therapeutic products could inherit such 
AUSFTA obligations arising from Annex 2C and Chapter 17. It then considers how these 
might impact on the regulation of safety, efficacy and cost-effectiveness for medicines and 
medical devices (including blood products) in New Zealand. 
 
The Trans-Tasman Regulatory Agency 
Australia and New Zealand have agreed in principle to the creation of a single agency for the 
regulation of pharmaceuticals and other therapeutic products to administering a trans-Tasman 
market.  The Australia New Zealand Therapeutic Products Authority (“ANZTPA”) is being 
developed to replace the Australian TGA and the NZ Medicines and Medical Devices Safety 
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Authority (Medsafe).12 In broad terms its regulatory activities will include: 1) pre-marketing 
evaluation and assessment 2) product licensing 3) controls on manufacture 4) post-market 
monitoring and surveillance and 5) setting standards. 
 One curious feature of the documentation surrounding the establishment of this 
agency, is a lack of substantial discussion whether obligations imposed on the Australia’s 
TGA under the AUSFTA will be taken up entirely by the ANZTPA.  In its submission to the 
Australian Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Medicines Australia (a lobby organisation 
for brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers located in Australia) noted the differences in 
intellectual property protection between New Zealand and Australia and submitted any 
resultant ambiguities should not be resolved in favour of the “weaker” New Zealand laws.  
Medicines Australia went further, suggesting that various measures should be included in the 
treaty to ensure Australia’s stronger intellectual property provisions apply.13  Concerns about 
precisely this possibility were expressed by the New Zealand Pharmaceutical Management 
Agency (“Pharmac”) and re-iterated by New Zealand’s Health Committee in its report on the 
ANZTPA: 
 
“Pharmac noted a number of concerns about the joint agency proposal, 
including possible increases in the cost of generic drugs, particularly for small 
market products, and possible increases in patent terms of medicines. In its 
written submission to us, Pharmac noted that unless rules were very carefully 
drafted, the cost of these latter increases as a flow-on effect of the free trade 
agreement between Australia and the United States of America could amount 
to between $85 and $135 million over 3 years.”14 
 
 There are eight main areas of concern regarding the application of the AUSFTA to the 
ANZTPA.  
                                                
12 Australia-New Zealand Therapeutic Products Agency. Available at:  http://www.anztpa.org (last accessed 14 
March 2006) 
13 Medicines Australia, Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Report 
62: Treaties Tabled on 30 March 2004. 
14 Health Committee, Parliament of New Zealand, International treaty examination of the Agreement between 
the Government of New Zealand and the Government of Australia for the establishment of a joint scheme for the 
regulation of therapeutic products, June 2004 at 3  
18 P Drahos, B Lokuge, TA Faunce, M Goddard and D Henry Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual Property and Free 
Trade: The Case of the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement 22(3) Prometheus 243 (2004) 
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1) “Linkage” Obligations and Evergreening 
The first area of concern involves the question of whether the “evergreening” notification 
provisions in article 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA will apply to the ANZTPA, as they do now to 
the TGA due to implementing changes to the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth).   
 Article 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA is the now notorious “evergreening” provision. Under 
article 17.10.4 (a) “marketing approval” by Australia’s TGA of a generic drug must be 
“prevented” when any type of patent is “claimed” by a brand-name manufacturer that has not 
“consented or acquiesced” to the generic market entry. Article 17.10.4 (b) creates an 
obligation for a brand name patent owner to be notified of any impending generic market 
entry. Australia passed amendments (ss26a and 26B) to its Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) 
late in 2004, establishing a certification process, which were designed to implement these 
obligations. 
 The “linkage” of marketing approval and patent status required by article 17.10.4 is 
not an obligation arising from the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights agreement 
(“TRIPS”) of the World Trade Organisation. It appears in the AUSFTA to cover only 
prescription medicines, but was originally interpreted by Australia’s TGA to also cover over-
the-counter and herbal medicines (although further legislation has temporarily rectified this 
misunderstanding). 
 Article 17.10.4 pursues PhRMA’s global agenda, repeatedly stated on the USTR 
“Trade Watch” list, of ensuring pharmaceutical marketing approval is linked with patent 
validity.18 Canada was made to implement a similar provision in its Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations in 1993 after entering the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Ever since, the Canadian Office of Patented Medicines and Liason, a 
body with specialist patent and public health expertise, has been closely scrutinising the 
inhibition by this mechanism, of rapid entry of cheap generic medicines to the market.19  
Classic “Hatch-Waxman” evergreening, as imposed on Canada after NAFTA, 
involves a brand name pharmaceutical company gaining regulatory notification of impending 
generic entry and then seeking an injunction to gain extra patent life and royalties, usually in 
relation to a “blockbuster” high sales volume drug.20 There are, however, now many other 
                                                
19 Interviews with senior members of the Office of Patented Medicines and Liason in Ottawa Canada 2005. 
20 This notification requirement was introduced to the US in the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, known colloquially as the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
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techniques of “evergreening”.21 One approach is to cluster multiple, even hundreds of, patents 
around each molecule covering not only its active compound, but also its uses and delivery 
systems. In time this strategy may extend to patenting combinations of drugs (aspirin with 
statins), or for linking each drug prescription to a genetic test. 
Another technique involves licensing agreements between the brand name owners of a 
soon-to-expire pharmaceutical “blockbuster” patent and generic companies (creating a so-
called “authorized” generic) and, increasingly, take-overs of generic companies by brand 
name manufacturers.22 The brand name pharmaceutical industry also extends its patent 
monopolies by driving out generic competition, for example by lobbying governments to 
implement mandatory price reductions by generics that reduce their profit margins.  
 The ANZTPA will be established by Australia as a body corporate under Australian 
legislation to administer the joint scheme in both countries.23 Under the joint scheme there 
will only be one application for marketing approval and one licence necessary for both 
Australia and New Zealand.  The obvious question is whether the ANZTPA will become a 
vehicle whereby New Zealand will be subjected to the AUSFTA article 17.10.4 
“evergreening” linkage requirements currently impose on Australia’s TGA.  
 Medicines Australia appears to have contemplated just such an outcome. In its 
submission to the Australian Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Inquiry into the ANZTPA, 
Medicines Australia expressed concern that: 
“The dual country licence may also exacerbate patent infringements that some 
of our members have experienced with products protected by patent being 
supplied by a generic company in contravention of the Patents Act.”24 
To combat this, Medicines Australia proposed the ANZTPA administer a measure similar to 
that outlined in article 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA where the patent holder was notified by 
ANZTPA regulators when they received an application to register a generic product.  In 
response, the Australian Government stated that: 
 
                                                
21 For a discussion of the various methods of evergreening employed in the US see National Institute for Health 
Care Management, ‘Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation’, May 2002, available at www.nihcm.org. 
22 See http://www.oligopolywatch.com.  Last accessed 7 February, 2006. 
23 Article 5.4 of the Australia New Zealand Agreement 
24 Medicines Australia, Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Inquiry into the Agreement 
Between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand for the Establishment of a Joint 
Scheme for the Regulation of Therapeutic Products Parliament of Australia, Report 62: Treaties Tabled on 30 
March 2004. 
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“We are focusing our attention on the regulatory aspects of the quality, safety 
and efficacy of therapeutic products rather than on the patent aspects, but we 
think that some of the measures that we will have in place that will deal with 
the safety issues in particular will meet some of the needs and concerns of 
Medicines Australia.”25 
 
This clarification by the Australian Government unfortunately still leaves the application of 
the provisions of 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA to the ANZTPA unclear.  The text of the ANZTPA 
Agreement provides that the Ministerial Council (comprising the Australian and New Zealand 
Ministers for Health) may make rules for the purposes of prescribing ‘notification 
requirements’ in respect of the manufacture, supply, import, export or promotion of 
therapeutic products.26  While no rules have been made to date, the potential clearly exists for 
the “evergreening” notification provisions under the AUSFTA to also apply to the ANZTPA.  
This possibility was recognised in New Zealand even before the AUSFTA was finalised: 
 
“[R]estrict[ion] or delay [in] access to cheap, generic medicines in New 
Zealand… is further exacerbated by the proposed free trade deal between 
Australia and the United States of America, which contains provisions that are 
designed to add further restrictions on the approval of generic medicines by the 
joint agency. These restrictions will make it more difficult for generic 
medicines to make it to the market, pushing up costs for Pharmac and hence 
the New Zealand taxpayer and reducing access to new medicines.”27 
 
It is possible (but operationally difficult) to specify that the measures required by 
article 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA could be “carved out” to operate only with respect to Australia 
under the ANZTPA.  Most likely, however, New Zealand may well be subjected to these 
“evergreening” obligations by default under the ANZTPA and generic manufacturers in both 
countries will be required to notify patent holders upon application for approval to market a 
generic product in either Australia or New Zealand.   
 Delayed entry of generic drugs as result of the brand name pharmaceutical patent 
“evergreening” strategies facilitated by articles such as 17.10.4, could have a significant 
impact on the viability of a nation’s generic pharmaceutical industry. The cost, for example, 
to the PBS and Australian taxpayers of an “evergreening”-induced 24 month delay to generic 
competition after brand name patent expiry over certain key classes of “blockbuster” 
                                                
25 Evidence to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Inquiry into the Agreement Between the Government of 
Australia and the Government of New Zealand for the Establishment of a Joint Scheme for the Regulation of 
Therapeutic Products Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 10 May 2004, 3 (Jeffery Ibbotson. 
26 Article 9, Australia New Zealand Agreement, above n 10. 
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pharmaceuticals has been estimated to be $1.1 billion over four years.28 Delayed entry of 
generic drugs will also affect the prices of pharmaceuticals purchased by private and public 
hospitals and over-the-counter medicines which are not covered by Government subsidies or 
safety nets. The end result is likely to be higher pharmaceutical costs in New Zealand. Public 
hospitals in New Zealand are also likely to face substantial rises in expenditure on their 
medicines budgets.29 
 There is an AUSFTA supervising committee (and possibly the Medicines Working 
Group) overseeing implementation of the “evergreening” notification provisions of 17.10.4. 
Its recommendations may mean that in time this obligation will apply not only to 
pharmaceuticals, but also to over-the-counter and complementary medicines.  Previously, 
New Zealand has not required pre-market approval for complementary medicines (often 
termed dietary supplements in New Zealand and regulated under food legislation).  Under the 
Joint Regulatory Scheme, however, these products will be regulated by the ANZTPA.  This 
has been one of the most controversial aspects of the Scheme in New Zealand.  The absence 
of an existing system for the regulation of complementary medicines in New Zealand will 
make it difficult for New Zealand to resist the blanket introduction of the current Australian 
arrangements for these products, including the “evergreening” notification provisions. 
 A related question will be whether the Australian “anti-evergreening” legislation 
introduced with the AUSFTA implementing legislation will also apply to the ANZTPA and to 
New Zealand. This legislation introduced a new ss 26C and 26D in the Therapeutic Goods 
Act 1989 (Cth).  The “anti-evergreening” amendments allow the Commonwealth Attorney-
General to join an application for an injunction by a brand name patent holder against a 
generic medicines manufacturer and to claim damages where the injunction has caused a price 
rise under the PBS.  While it is unlikely that any generic company will use these provisions to 
litigate due to financial constraints and cross-ownership in the industry, the existence of the 
“anti-evergreening” amendments may prove valuable in a likely trade dispute with the US 
over the PBS.  In the event of a textual ambiguity in the AUSFTA, recourse may be had to 
supplementary materials to determine obligations contained in the agreement under article 32 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Australia may be able use the “anti-
evergreening” amendments as evidence that it had a legitimate expectation that the AUSFTA, 
and article 17.10.4 in particular would not increase medicines prices under the PBS. Unless 
                                                                                                                                                   
27 Health Committee, Parliament of New Zealand, above n 111 at 12. 
28  
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New Zealand introduced similar legislation at the time it entered the ANZTPA it is unclear 
whether it could take advantage of these Australian “anti-evergreening” amendments. 
 The US has clearly signalled its disapproval of the Australian “anti-evergreening” 
amendments stating their belief that the amendments “impose a potentially significant, 
unjustifiable and discriminatory burden on the enjoyment of patent rights”.30  However, in 
challenging the amendments on the basis that they are discriminatory as to the field of 
technology and thus a breach of Article 27.1 of the TRIPS, the US is on weak ground. 
Immediately prior to finalising the AUSFTA negotiations, the US legislature passed its 
Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernisation Act 2003. Included in section 
1101 of that Act was a complicated process of early declaratory relief to assist remedying the 
problem of brand name pharmaceutical patent “evergreening.” This implemented a specific 
recommendation in the report of the US Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in 2002. The 
FTC recommendation was that only one “evergreening” injunction against a potential generic 
market entrant be permitted per product.31   
 
2) Fast Tracking “Innovative” Medical Products 
 Second, of significant concern for both the efficiency of the ANZTPA and the ongoing 
fiscal benefits flowing from New Zealand’s Pharmac and the Pharmaceutical Schedule it 
manages, is a specific obligation imposed on Australia’s TGA by Annex 2C(4) of the 
AUSFTA. Annex 2C(4) requires: 
 
  Regulatory Co-Operation 
The Parties shall seek to advance the existing dialogue between the Australian 
Therapeutic Goods Administration and the US Food and Drug 
Administration with a view to making innovative medical products more 
quickly available to their nationals. [emphasis added] 
 
 This provision appears likely to oblige the ANZTPA (as the inheritor organization of 
the Australian TGA) to engage in dialogue with the US FDA on the expedition of marketing 
                                                                                                                                                   
29 B Lokuge, TA Faunce, R Denniss, A Backdoor to Higher Medicine Prices?” Intellectual Property and the 
Australia-US Free Trade Agreement Australia Institute (2003)  
30 Letter from Robert Zoellick, US Trade Representative to Mark Vaile, Australian Minister for Trade, 17 
November 2004, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Implementation/asset_upload_file393_6
951.pdf. 
31 Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study Federal Trade 
Commission (2002).  
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approval for “innovative” medical products.  This provision will facilitate rapid market access 
for products, ensuring their patent rent-earning capacity is as long as possible. It may, 
however, compromise the ability of the ANZTPA to do thorough reviews of emerging new 
medical technologies (such as nanomedical products).The US Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”), for example, has recently come under intense public and governmental scrutiny for 
perceived inadequacies and conflicts of interest arising from its willingness to respond to such 
“fast track” pressures.32  
 AUSFTA Annex 2C(4), however, may also become a Trojan Horse whereby 
pharmaceutical interests begin to lobby for “innovation” changes to New Zealand’s 
Pharmac’s processes such as tendering and pooled procurement of frequently used 
pharmaceuticals, without the necessity of having to grant reciprocal trade concessions.  In the 
ongoing corporate lobbying of government that follows such obligations generic medicines 
(which have difficulties satisfying “innovation” criteria), are often marginalised. 
 Pharmac was originally established under the Health and Disabilities Services Act 
(1993) (NZ) (now the Public Health and Disability Act 2000 (NZ)) with the specific purpose 
of securing for “eligible people in need of pharmaceuticals, the best health outcomes that are 
reasonably achievable from pharmaceutical treatment and from within the funding provided.” 
Pharmac, with the assistance of independent medical experts on the Pharmacology and 
Therapeutics Advisory Committee (“PTAC”) and its specialist sub-committees, manages, on 
cost-effectiveness grounds set out in guidelines, a Federal formulary, known as the 
Pharmaceutical Schedule. Patients and their advocacy groups have input into Pharmac’s 
listing decisions through a Consumer Advisory Committee. One of its major advances 
involves the use of tendering for low cost generic medicines.33 In determining whether a 
product should be listed, Pharmac must consider the health needs of people within New 
Zealand, the existing alternative medicines available, the clinical benefits and risks of 
pharmaceuticals, the cost-effectiveness of using pharmaceuticals, the budgetary impacts of 
listing a certain product and the direct cost to the health service user.  In determining the 
subsidy at which a product is listed, Pharmac may use any one of a number of pricing 
                                                
32 Ray WA, Stein CM: ‘Reform of drug regulation-Beyond an Independent Drug-Safety Board’: New 
England Journal of Medicine 2006, 354(2); 194-201 
33 New Zealand Pharmaceutical Management Agency  [ http://www.pharmac.govt.nz/who_are_pharmac.asp ] 
last accessed 12 Dec 2005 
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mechanisms including reference pricing, listing contracts, rebate arrangements, bundling 
arrangements, tendering and parity pricing.34 
 Recent speculation that Pharmac tendering-style arrangements would be introduced in 
Australia in order to contain the cost of the PBS met with strong criticism from the 
pharmaceutical industry in both New Zealand and Australia.35  Pharmac is likely to be such a 
target simply because of its success.  It was established with the objective of securing the best 
health outcomes reasonably achievable from pharmaceutical treatment and within the funding 
provided by the government.36  Between 1998 and 2002, the average annual change in 
pharmaceutical expenditure in New Zealand was 1.4%, compared to 14.5% in the US, 9.7% 
in the UK and 12.1% for Australia.37  
 Supporting this possibility is the fact that AUSFTA Annex 2C(1)(c) emphasises 
“timely and affordable access to innovative pharmaceuticals” through “transparent, 
expeditious, and accountable procedures.” This suggests an explicit link between Annex 
2C(1)(c) (“timely and affordable access to innovative pharmaceuticals”) and Annex 2C(4) 
(dialogue on “making innovative medical products more quickly available”).  
 Alternatively, however, Annex 2C(4) also opens the door for the US FDA, should it so 
wish, to commence discussions with ANZTPA representatives on introducing a new system 
for recognizing pharmaceutical innovation that links “innovation” to community cost 
effectiveness in comparison with existing alternate drug therapies. This scenario could arise 
from ANZTPA incorporating for the purposes of Annex 2C(4), the unusual definition of 
“innovation” specified in Annex 2C(1). 
 Annex 2C(1) commences with this statement of primary or overarching principle: 
“The Parties are committed to facilitating high quality health care and continued 
                                                
34 Operating Policies and Procedures of the Pharmaceutical Management Agency, 3rd Edition, January 2006, at 
http://www.pharmac.govt.nz/pdf/231205.pdf, viewed 17 February, 2006. 
35‘NZ way no way for Australia’s PBS’, Pharma in Focus, 14 February, 2006; ‘Warning to Government from 
Biotech on PBS Changes’, Medicines Australia Media Release, 30 January, 2006, at 
http://www.medicinesaustralia.com.au, viewed 16 February, 2006. 
36 See http://www.pharmac.govt.nz.  Last accessed 7 February, 2006. 
37 Pharmaceutical Management Agency. Annual review. Wellington New Zealand. PHARMAC 2002. JM 
Tordoff, PT Norris, DM Reith, “Managing Prices for Hospital Pharmaceuticals: A successful Strategy for New 
Zealand?” (2005) 8(3) Value in Health. The Journal of the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and 
Outcomes Reasearch 201-208. 
42 J Abraham and T Reed, “Progress, Innovation and regulatory Science in Drug Development. The Politics of 
International Standard Setting” (2002) 32(3) Social Studies of Science 337-369. 
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improvements in public health for their nationals.” The article then continues to enumerate a 
series of subsidiary principles: 
 
 “In pursuing these objectives, the Parties are committed to the following principles: 
a) the important role played by innovative pharmaceutical products in delivering high 
quality health care 
b) the importance of research and development in the pharmaceutical industry and of 
appropriate government support, including through intellectual property protection 
and other policies 
c) the need to promote timely and affordable access to innovative pharmaceuticals 
through transparent, expeditious, and accountable procedures, without impeding a 
Party’s ability to apply appropriate standards of quality, safety, and efficacy; and 
d) the need to recognize the value of innovative pharmaceuticals through the 
operation of competitive markets or by adopting or maintaining procedures that 
appropriately value the objectively demonstrated therapeutic significance of a 
pharmaceutical [emphasis added]. 
 
  Inserting a corporate-defined conception of “innovation” as a major policy driver into 
the ANZTPA and perhaps into Pharmac would undoubtedly compromise policy principles 
that have been more thoroughly tested by democratic processes, such as “equity” and “social 
justice. 
 However there is some evidence that “innovation” has been set in Annex 2C(1) of the 
AUSFTA in a context which emphasises objective proof of the social value of innovation. 
Annex 2C(1)(a), for example, links “innovation” with “high quality health care.” Annex 
2C(1)(c) sets pharmaceutical innovation within the context of “affordability” and 
“accountability” and Annex 2C(1)(d) creates a commitment by the parties that recognition of 
innovative pharmaceuticals may involve either “competitive markets” (hence the necessity for 
collusion and other anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical industry to be policed by 
regulators) or “procedures that appropriately value the objectively demonstrated therapeutic 
significance” of a pharmaceutical (the scientific approach to cost-effectiveness evaluation 
prior to government reimbursement).  
 While brand-name pharmaceutical industry rhetoric frequently links its new 
“innovative” products with improved public health, there is very little, if any, research that 
establishes that link.42 Much genuine innovation in medicines development continues to arise 
from public funded university R&D expenditure and be supported by specific government 
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programs.44  Tax concessions have also been important stimulators of pharmaceutical 
innovation.45 
 However, because they minimise costs of pharmaceuticals for taxpayers in Australia 
and New Zealand, cost-effectiveness and reference pricing mechanisms are constantly lobbied 
against by brand-name pharmaceutical multinationals. The US government was recently 
prohibited by pharmaceutical company-sponsored legislation from using its bulk buying 
power to bargain down drug costs.46 PhRMA, throughout the AUSFTA negotiations, 
frequently criticised reference pricing and cost-effectiveness aspects of the PBS as a “trade 
distorting, abusive, or discriminatory price control”.47 Their numerous lobbyists convinced 
the US Government to believe and argue, without substantial supportive research being 
adduced, that a viable strategy medicines policy in the US and Australia would ensure 
consumers in all countries, not just the US, paid for the high research and development 
(R&D) costs required to make “innovative” pharmaceuticals.48  
 A major problem here is that the members of PhRMA have yet to disclose the 
marginal cost of production for each allegedly “innovative” drug.49 Further, reliable evidence 
now suggests that US pharmaceutical companies spend 2-3 times more on marketing, 
administration and lobbying than on R&D, and their profits are approximately twice such 
costs.50 The Australian Productivity Commission has confirmed that the largest price 
differences between Australia and the US are for aggressively marketed non-innovative “me-
                                                
44 Department of Industry, Tourism & Resources. 2004, ‘Pharmaceutical Industry Investment Program’, 
Department of Industry, Tourism & Resources. Available: 
http://www.industry.gov.au/content/sitemap.cfm?objectid=48A506B0-20E0-68D8-ED81D261FE5594 
45 Australian Government, ‘Backing Australia’s Ability: Building Out Future Through Science and Innovation’ 
2004, available at http://backingaus.innovation.gov.au/2004/research/rd_tax_conc.htm. 
46 Angell M, Excess in the Pharmaceutical Industry 171 (2) CMAJ 1451 (2004).  
47 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. 2003, ‘PhRMA “Special 301” submission to the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative: Australia’, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America. Available: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/australia/phrma-au-2003.html, (viewed 13 March 2006) 
48 Colebatch T, Bush wants end to medicine subsidies, The Age, 24/10/2003; Pg 5. 
49 National Science Foundation, Research and Development in Industry 2000 (2003) 
50 Families USA Foundation. 2002, Profiting from Pain: Where Prescription Drug Dollars Go. Families USA 
Publication No. 02-10.  The ‘free rider’ argument put forward by the pharmaceutical industry to justify its quest 
to remove price controls in foreign countries was countered recently in Donald W Light and Joel Lexchin, 
‘Foreign free riders and the high price of US medicines’ 331 BMJ 958 (2005).  
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too” pharmaceuticals. These drugs, though marketed as innovative generally only involve 
small molecular variations and are aggressively promoted to capture lucrative niche markets. 
PBS prices for new drugs providing genuine benefit are much closer to US prices.51  
 Perhaps, however, many may believe such concerns about the ANZTPA are 
unfounded. Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile said, for example, at the conclusion of the 
AUSFTA negotiations that, “the PBS, in particular the price and listing arrangements that 
ensure Australians’ access to quality, affordable medicines, remains intact.”52 
 
3) Direct to Consumer Advertising 
 The third problem for the ANZTPA is that the preferred pharmaceutical industry 
model of reduced scientific evaluation of cost-effectiveness and increased direct-to-consumer 
advertising (DTCA) may be facilitated. AUSFTA Annex 2C(5) permits a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer to disseminate pharmaceutical information via the internet, for example, via 
links on sites frequently used by Australian patients. This appears to be a PhRMA strategy to 
begin the process of lobbying for direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) in Australia. DTCA 
is legal in the USA and New Zealand, but not in Australia.  It has been associated with a 
substantial increase in usage of the products which are often not in accord with clinical best-
practice.53 The problem is that including Annex 2C(5) in the ANZTPA could effectively 
entrench DTCA in the New Zealand system, even if a subsequent New Zealand government 
became convinced that evidence showed it was harming public health or public expenditure 
on pharmaceuticals. 
 In the US, pharmaceuticals can be marketed directly to the consumer, provided they 
have been shown to be safe and effective in animal and human studies when compared with a 
placebo (effectively nothing). Industry can increase revenue simply by increasing advertising 
to doctors and direct to patients.  
 This is an area of major policy difference in Australasia, with New Zealand permitting 
DTCA and Australia prohibiting it on prescription medicines.  Concerns have been expressed 
                                                
51 Productivity Commission. 2001, ‘International Pharmaceutical Price Differences: Research Report’, 
Productivity Commission, Melbourne 2001. Available: 
http://www.pc.gov.au/study/pbsprices/finalreport/pbsprices.pdf 
52 Vaile, M. 2004, ‘Free Trade Agreement with the United States”, Media Release, 8 February, 
MVT08/2004.Available:http.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2004/mvt008 
53 Mintzes, B. et al. 2002, ‘An assessment of the health system impacts of direct-to-consumer advertising of 
prescription medicines (DTCA)’, Centre for Health Services and Policy research, The University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada. Available: http://www.chspr.ubc.ca/hpru/pdf/dtca-v1-execsum.pdf.   
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by the Australian Medical Association that the creation of a joint regulatory scheme between 
Australia and New Zealand to harmonise regulatory practices between the two countries 
would result in DTCA occurring in Australia.54  Such concerns are further exacerbated by the 
desire of New Zealand to enter into a free trade agreement with the US in which DTAC 
would almost certainly be provided for.   
Recently, as part of the implementation of the joint regulatory scheme, the Australian 
and New Zealand governments developed the Australia New Zealand Therapeutic Products 
Advertising Code to regulate the advertising, both branded and unbranded, of therapeutic 
products in all forms of media, including the internet.55  While recognising the prohibition in 
Australia on DTCA of prescription medicines, the Code sets out requirements for advertising 
of each type of therapeutic product and an approvals process for DTCA.  The existence of the 
Code and its application to prescription medicines in New Zealand and to internet advertising 
in Australia may contribute to pressure on Australia to harmonise with the US and New 
Zealand and permit DTCA of prescription medicines. 
 
4) Cost-Recovery and Independence 
 The fifth problem, though one chiefly exacerbating the lobbying effects mentioned 
earlier, involves considerations of whether the ANZTPA will seek full cost recovery from 
industry.  While the Australian Government is to provide funding for the establishment and 
implementation of the joint scheme and New Zealand is to contribute to the financial 
requirements of the ANZTPA, the Australian and New Zealand Governments anticipate the 
ANZTPA will operate on a full cost recovery basis within 5 years.56 The problems faced by 
the US FDA in the Vioxx scandal57 reveal how difficult it may become for the ANZTPA to 
operate as an effective regulator if it is not actually and perceived to be at full arms’ length 
from industry pressure. 
 In addition, full cost recovery may increase the cost of gaining regulatory approval for 
therapeutic products with the effect of raising barriers to entry to the market.  Pharmac 
                                                
54 Australian Medical Association, Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of 
Australia, Report 62: Treaties Tabled on 30 March 2004. 
55 Australia New Zealand Therapeutic Products Advertising Code, available at 
http://www.anztpa.org/advert/advmodel.htm. 
56 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Report 62: Treaties Tabled on 30 March 2004, 
2.44. 
57 See Richard Horton, ‘Vioxx, the implosion of Merck, and aftershocks at the FDA’ (2004) 364 The Lancet 
1995. 
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submitted that the high fees to be imposed by the ANZTPA in order to fully recover its costs 
may restrict or delay access to cheap, generic medicines.58 
 
                                                
58 Health Committee, Parliament of New Zealand, above n 111 at 12. 
87 Article 4 of TRIPS provides that with respect to intellectual property any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.  Thus, the standards of intellectual property protection 
agreed to under the AUSFTA must be granted to all WTO members.  When a sufficient number of WTO 
members have increased intellectual property protection above the TRIPS minimum, an attempt to  put the 
TRIPS standards back on the negotiating agenda is likely to be successful. 
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5) The TRIPS-Plus IP Ratchet 
Chapter 17 of the AUSFTA includes a variety of provisions apparently designed to protect the 
interests of US pharmaceutical multinationals in ways which go further than the TRIPS 
agreement. This has led these provisions to be characterised as “TRIPS-PLUS” although in 
terms of their impact on social welfare and public health “TRIPS-MINUS” would probably be 
a more apt descriptor. Australia may decide to “share the pain” and expose regional 
neighbours to similar provisions in its bilaterals. The US is also highly likely to seek to 
include similar provisions in other bilaterals it enters into in Australasia. Such provisions 
could also become part of the US attempt to ratchet up global intellectual property protection 
via multiple bilateral and regional trade agreements and ultimately a renegotiation of 
TRIPS.87  Further, the availability of strong intellectual property protection for 
pharmaceuticals in Australia allows the pharmaceutical industry to exert pressure on 
governments throughout the region to provide equivalent intellectual property protection with 
the threat of moving their manufacturing facilities to Australia.  The economic and public 
health implications of a pharmaceutical industry pull out may be sufficient to compel 
Australasian nations to bow to industry demands.   
 There are several areas of intellectual property protection that the US was 
unsuccessful in securing in the TRIPS negotiations but which have been included in the 
AUSFTA that may have an impact on medicines policy in Australasia. 
 The AUSFTA prohibits parallel importation under article 17.9.4. This was something 
that the US certainly had not managed to achieve in negotiations at the multilateral level. This 
proscription represents a manifest circumvention of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health which had confirmed that each WTO member may establish its own regime of 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights, and thus that such parallel importation could not be 
considered a violation of TRIPS.88 It makes little sense in terms of free trade policy as it 
merely protects an industry from a competitive advantage obtained by mechanisms such as 
government reimbursement based on cost-effectiveness evaluations. The fear of parallel 
importation has been a major factor in the reluctance of the international pharmaceutical 
industry to allow the manufacture of cheap anti-retrovirals in Africa. 
 Compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals is restricted under article 17.9.7 to a 
standard more stringent than that applying in TRIPS. Having failed in multilateral fora to 
restrict this exemption to specific diseases like HIV/AIDS or malaria, PhRMA in article 
                                                
88 E t’Hoen “TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to 
Doha” (2002) 3 Chi J Int’l L 27-41 
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17.9.7 achieved a restriction on compulsory licensing to “TRIPS-PLUS” standard of “national 
emergency, or other circumstances of extreme urgency”.89 It would be imprudent to claim that 
this is not a substantial restriction on compulsory licensing, given that government policy 
decisions in this area will undoubtedly be subjected to lobbying from industry if they are 
perceived to threaten market share. Brazil provides a good example of a country that has used 
the TRIPS compulsory licensing exception to good effect when faced with a public health 
problem. This restriction in the AUSFTA creates the bizarre possibility that Australian 
domestic public health policy may in the future be evaluated by a three person panel of trade 
lawyers, not public health experts, to determine whether it adequately fits the criteria of 
“extreme urgency”. 
 Export of generic drugs while under patent in Australia (for example to assist a public 
health crisis in a neighbouring country) is prevented under article 17.9.6. This “export-under-
patent” rule is permitted under TRIPS and the Australian generic pharmaceutical industry 
lobbied hard for its exclusion from the AUSFTA but failed. They estimate that this caused 
them a significant loss of profits.90  This provision prevents Australian generic manufacturers 
from supplying a drug to developing countries that have issued a compulsory licence over the 
drug but do not have the necessary domestic manufacturing capacity and have thus made use 
of the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health.91  This provision will also prevent the free flow of therapeutic 
products between Australia and New Zealand under the new joint regulatory regime, despite 
that being one of the aims of the scheme.92 
 Article 17.9.8 of the AUSFTA locks the parties into the enhanced protectionist patent 
terms where there have been delays in issuing patent approval. By this article PhRMA 
appears to have sought to circumvent the tactic of some countries to inhibit its socially 
inappropriate patent protectionism by adopting delayed administrative approaches to initial 
registration. One of the main areas of difference between the patent laws of Australia and 
New Zealand is the patentability of methods of medical treatment for humans.  Australia 
                                                
89 FM Abbott, “The TRIPS-legality of measures taken to address public health crises: Responding to USTR-
State-industry positions that undermine the WTO” in DL Kennedy and JD Southwick (eds), The Political 
Economy of International Trade Law Cambridge University Press(2002) 311-348 
90  
91 Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (30 
August 2003), Doc WT/L/540. 
92 See above n 11 
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allows methods of medical treatment to be patented.93 New Zealand’s Full Court of Appeal 
has recently reaffirmed that methods of medical treatment are excluded from patentability.94 
 
6) The Blood Products Problem 
The fifth problem relates to blood products. The establishment of the ANZTPA and the 
undertaking by Australia and New Zealand to include the regulation of blood products may 
have significant ramifications for New Zealand through Australia’s obligations under 
AUSFTA to review its current plasma fractionation contract and to set aside the requirement 
that imported products demonstrate significant clinical advantage.  Supply of blood and blood 
products may be delayed or interrupted, and the safety of manufactured products may be 
reduced. 
 This article has argued that New Zealand may be at a significant disadvantage in 
seeking to obtain its own trade deal with the US if it allows the ANZTPA to impose upon its 
medicines regulatory system the “evergreening” generic notification obligations in article 
17.10.4 and the “innovation” lobbying principles in Annex 2C. The best solution for New 
Zealand would be to ensure that such obligations represented a “carve out” of its 
responsibilities under the ANZTPA. Alternatively, if the ANZTPA were to impose such 
obligations on New Zealand it should demand reciprocal trade concessions from the United 
States whose brand name pharmaceutical companies stand to benefit the most from them. 
 In order to ensure the preservation of cost-effectiveness pricing over medicines both 
Australia and New Zealand should explore the possibility of including provisions related to it 
in bilateral trade deals with nations such as China. 
                                                
93 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Limited (1994) 28 IPR 383, (1994) 122 ALR 141. 
94 Pfizer v Commissioner of Patents (2004) 60 IPR 624,  
100 US Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Australia-U.S. Medicines Working Group holds first 
meeting’, 14 January 2006.  Available at http://www.globalhealth.gov/Australia_meds_011406.shtml.  This 
article and the accompanying photograph represent all that is publicly available about the composition and terms 
of reference of the Medicines Working Group. 
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The potential public health impact of the AUSFTA in New Zealand through the new ANZTPA extends beyond 
pharmaceuticals into the blood sector. Australia and New Zealand have agreed to include the 
regulation of blood products under the authority of the new joint body.  Currently both 
Australia and New Zealand are self-sufficient in their supply of fresh blood and plasma 
products.  Donations in both countries are collected from non-remunerated volunteers, by the 
Australian Red Cross Blood Service (ARCBS) and the New Zealand Blood Service (NZBS).  
Unpaid donations are well established to be a safer source than those from paid ‘donors’.[1-4] 
CSL Limited has an exclusive contract with the Australian Government, the Plasma 
Fractionation Agreement (PFA), to provide all of Australia’s fractionation services, and is 
also the national provider of fractionation services to New Zealand, Malaysia, Hong Kong 
and Singapore.[5]  New Zealand sends 38500kg of plasma for fractionation annually to 
Australia for processing by CSL Limited,[6] which is then returned to New Zealand as 
manufactured product. 
While Chapter 15 of the AUSFTA (“Government Procurement”) initially specifically 
excludes plasma fractionation, in an exchange of side letters Australia agreed to complete a 
review of the PFA by January 2007, with the view to terminating CSL ’s contract and opening 
to tender, to US companies, Australia’s plasma fractionation.[7] One US company in 
particular, Baxter Healthcare, has shown considerable interest in Australian plasma 
fractionation, lobbying the Australian Government during trade negotiations to abandon the 
PFA and open the service to tender.[8] 
If the review[9] finds in favour of an open tender process for Australia’s plasma fractionation, 
there are significant potential consequences for New Zealand’s blood supply. 
First, if CSL Ltd is no longer processing Australia’s plasma, it may no longer be able to 
provide a cost-effective service to New Zealand, forcing New Zealand to send its plasma 
further afield.  Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong may be similarly affected. Second, New 
Zealand may also be required to open its own processing arrangements to tender, or will be 
under added pressure to do so in their own trade negotiations with the US.  
The NZBS is concerned primarily with the potential cost increases arising from the joint 
authority of changes to standards: 
The advent of the Trans-Tasman Joint Regulatory Agency …  has the capacity to 
significantly influence the framework and standards under which NZBS operates [6, p.2] 
 
NZBS expect a significant increase in their costs of compliance with the new ANZTPA, and 
reduced interaction between NZBS and the regulating authority, compared with what they 
currently enjoy with MedSafe.[6, p.25]  They are concern ed that regulations will be imposed 
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rather than developed through an interactive process between the blood service and the new 
regulator. [6, p.26] 
However, there are several other areas that they should be concerned about as they may 
potentially be adversely affected under AUSFTA.  In the same report, the NZBS states its 
commitment to several aspects of their service provision: 
Ensuring that a continuous supply of safe blood products and services is available to all New 
Zealanders at all times (p.6) 
 
That donors expect that “The gift status of blood and blood products will be preserved” (p.7). 
 
That patients and consumers expect that “Blood and blood products will be free of any charge other 
than recovery of NZBS 
processing and testing costs” (p.7). 
 
The first undertaking could be threatened by offshore manufacture of blood products.  A key 
role of the NZBS is to maintain the national supply chain of blood and blood products.  This 
capacity will be diminished should the tender for plasma fractionation services in Australia be 
opened, reducing ability to ensure rapid delivery to areas in need. Distance, reduced potential 
for continued quality assurance and loss of the chain of supply means that blood products may 
not be available when required, their safety may be reduced and their origins more difficult to 
trace. In there were to be a significant disaster where large quantities of blood and derived 
products are required, there will be increased delay in supply to New Zealand.   
The altruism expressed in the second NZBS commitment is compromised as blood becomes 
further commercialised, and sold on for profit, and it may be difficult to reconcile the third 
with blood going overseas for processing and being resold as a value added product 
specifically to create profit for commercial companies. 
  Some limited products (e.g. clotting agents) are imported by Australia and New Zealand, but 
only when significant clinical superiority to local products has been demonstrated.  In the 
exchange of letters, however, Australia agreed to set aside requirements of demonstrated 
clinical improvement in imported products,[7] opening the door to more, potentially less safe 
products. 
Blood products imported from the US are potentially less safe than those manufactured from 
donors in Australia and New Zealand because ‘donors’ in the US are often paid (up to 
US$200 per month legitimately,[10] or more if they attend different collection centres and 
donate more often than recommended).  Blood that is bought is more likely to carry infection 
than that from altruistic donation. [1-4] Futhermore, there is a growing global trade in blood 
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where products are manufactured in the more developed countries from blood that has been 
sourced from the poor in developing countries,[11] effectively “laundered” in the process so 
the original source may be impossible to trace.  The setting aside under AUSFTA of the 
clinical improvement requirement potentially reduces New Zealand’s capacity to ensure 
safety in its blood products. 
The value of safe blood from Australia and New Zealand may be such that a special market is 
created overseas.  Blood and plasma may be exported for processing, and then perhaps only a 
proportion of it bought back while some finds its way into the veins of those who can afford 
it. **Tom – did you want to say more about this?** 
The advent of the ANZTPA could potentially lead to Australia and New Zealand being 
treated as a single, larger source of blood and plasma and a single market in buying back 
blood products, with no differentiation between the two. If the high standards of each country 
are maintained, this may not be a safety issue, although it could become a political one if one 
countries donations were perceived to be shoring up the blood supply of the other. 
With the ANZTPA, New Zealand may find itself tied to Australia’s obligations under the 
AUSFTA, and become a an unwitting  participant in the global blood trade. 
 
7) Medical Devices Issues 
Regulatory Co-Operation 
The Parties shall seek to advance the existing dialogue between the Australian 
Therapeutic Goods Administration and the US Food and Drug 
Administration with a view to making innovative medical products more 
quickly available to their nationals. [emphasis added] 
Sponsors of medical devices who are legally supplying those products in Australia or New 
Zealand prior to commencement of the joint scheme will qualify for a transitional approval to 
be known as an interim product licence. This licence will authorise the continued supply of 
the medical device, in the jurisdiction in which it was previously being lawfully supplied, for 
the duration of a defined transition period. Any manufacturer who holds a valid 
manufacturing licence issued by Medsafe or the TGA prior to commencement of the Agency 
will be issued an interim manufacturing licence. Transitional arrangements will be required to 
give sponsors and manufacturers of prescription and OTC medicines in Australia and New 
Zealand time to achieve compliance with regulatory requirements under the joint scheme. 
These arrangements will be based on the principles set out in the Treaty. Certain applications 
will have been approved by the TGA or Medsafe, however similar applications for approval 
may have been rejected by the other agency. This may relate to the entire application or may 
only relate to certain aspects of the application. For example, an application for a new 
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medicine may include application for several, related indications. It is conceivable that one 
agency may approve use in all indications whereas the other agency may reject certain 
indications.In cases where a whole application has been rejected in one country or the other, 
sponsors will need to provide the Agency with relevant documentation leading to the 
rejection. A decision on the suitability of the product for a full Agency licence will be made 
based on these submissions. Additional concerns in this area are corporate-lead international 
harmonisation processes in safety and efficacy evaluation of medical devices, that appear to 
undermine the precautionary principle by shifting the burden of proof to public authorities 
post marketing approval.1 
 
8) Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 Annex 2C(3) establishes a “Medicines Working Group” between health officials from 
each country. The Medicines Working Group is prohibited from promoting discussion and 
mutual understanding on the issues mentioned in Annex 2C(4), which relate to “advancing the 
existing dialogue between the Australian TGA and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) with a view to making innovative medical products more quickly available to their 
nationals.”  Whether this precludes the Medicines Working Group from discussing any of the 
issues related to “innovative” pharmaceuticals in Annex 2C(1) is unclear.  However, 
regardless of the correct interpretation of the scope of topics to be discussed by the Working 
Group, it appears that when the Group met for the first time in January this year, “innovation” 
issues were on the agenda.100    
 The Medicines Working Group is not authorised under the AUSFTA to discuss any 
aspect of the PBS, whether legislative in nature or otherwise that is not mentioned in Annex 
2C. It, for example, cannot explore elements of the cost-effectiveness system established by 
judicial decisions, such as the “leakage” of official to unauthorised usage.101 Similarly, it 
should not be able to discuss comparison of the product proposed for marketing approval 
against non-pharmaceutical alternatives.102 The Annex 2C(1) principles are given greater 
weight in the AUSFTA by being linked to the dispute resolution mechanisms of Chapter 21 
through a non-violation nullification of benefits (NVNB) article (article 21.2(c)). NVNB 
provisions are much despised in international trade law settings, particularly by those 
countries and non governmental organisations seeking to expand access to essential 
                                                
101 Pfizer v Birkett [2002] FCA 303. 
102 Glaxosmithkline Australia v Anderson [2003] FCA 617. 
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medicines.103  NVNB articles are really a supercharged mechanism of commercially-focused 
treaty interpretation, drawing the focus toward expectations of profit and away from actual 
text. 104 They allow dispute resolution proceedings to be commenced where only the “spirit” 
of the treaty had been broken. Developing and developed countries alike have fought for and 
succeeded in placing a moratorium on the invocation of such causes of action under TRIPS.105  
However, the NVNB provisions of the AUSFTA apply to Annex 2C and Chapter 17 on 
Intellectual Property and leave Australia open to US claims that its legitimate expectations 
regarding innovation have not been met.  
 Under the dispute resolution process, the ultimate meaning of pharmaceutical 
“innovation” in the AUSFTA and its impact on medicines policy may be determined by a 
three person panel of trade lawyers. This interpretation will be resolved in the shadow of 
threats of cross retaliation in other trade sectors, such as manufacturing and agriculture, or 
massive compensation claims. 
 These AUSFTA principles could influence medicines policy in Australasia through 
the regional influence of the Australian pharmaceutical market and regulatory system. If 
industry lobbyists in New Zealand, for example, are able to point to “innovation” changes in 
Australia’s PBAC processes it will facilitate New Zealand government concession to make 
similar changes to New Zealand’s Pharmaceutical Management Agency (Pharmac) processes. 
Principles of pharmaceutical innovation are not related to the TRIPS agreement and so there 
is no technical obligation for them to be included in other bilaterals. Nevertheless, the 
AUSFTA could be seen a providing a “bridgehead” precedent for including similar articles in 
bilaterals aimed at influencing pharmaceutical price control mechanisms.  With New Zealand 
eager to secure a free trade deal with the US106 but the US showing some reluctance,107 
                                                
103 JP Trachtman, “The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution” 40 HARVARD Int L J 333 (1999).  See also 
Communication from Peru to the Council for TRIPs, 4 October 2002 IP/C/W/385. 
104 KJ Harvey, TA Faunce, B Lokuge, P Drahos, Will the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 
Undermine the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme? 181 (5) MED J AUST 256 (2004) 
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industry lobby groups may see this as an opportunity to make inroads into New Zealand’s 
commitment to pharmaceutical price control mechanisms 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
107 United States Trade Representative, Rob Portman, told a media briefing in Washington on 25 January 2006 
that the US would rule out talking to small economies, which would include New Zealand.  See 
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=3667. 
131 Senator Kyl, instrumental in the AUSFTA negotiations on the PBS, stated, for example, to a Joint Hearing by 
the Subcommittees on Health Care and International Trade of the US Senate Committee on Finance that “for the 
first time, a trade agreement negotiated by the United States has addressed the worldwide problem of 
prescription drug price controls.” Senator Kyl admitted US citizens paid 60% more for their drugs than other 
nations, but said the solution was not to adopt cost-effectiveness pricing in the US, but to dismantle it elsewhere. 
Senator Kyl, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health Care, Joint Hearing by the Subcommittees on Health 
Care and International Trade of the US Senate Committee on Finance April 27 2004 
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/statements/042704k.pdf [accessed 5.10.04] 
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Conclusion 
One of the main impacts of the AUSFTA on medicines policy in Australia, New Zealand and 
their region, it has been argued here, will be increased lobbying designed to remove the 
structures of cost-effectiveness pricing. Reference pricing, for example, is an aspect of 
scientific cost-effectiveness evaluation of medicines that has been alleged by PhRMA and its 
Australian mouthpiece Medicines Australia, with the backing of the US Trade Representative 
and Department of Commerce, in the context of AUSFTA innovation obligations, to 
constitute a non tariff barrier to full market access for its innovative products. Numerous 
“innovative” products are alleged to be in the production pipeline and to be capable of 
delivering vast improvements in healthcare outcomes. The research supporting such claims is 
thin and dubious and it is never suggested that policy changes be automatically reversed if the 
promised beneficial outcomes never eventuate. Coupled with such claims is the ideologic 
stance that Australasian consumers (“patients” to those yet giving normative weight to the 
traditional ethical and human rights norms of the profession) are “free riding” on US research 
and development. 131 
What should be kept in mind by governments evaluating industry lobbying based on 
such claims is that at most 25% of the budgets of PhRMA’s members allegedly goes to R&D 
and only a portion of this is dedicated to discovering “breakthrough” drugs. Most is spent on 
making minor (“me-too”) variations to existing, profitable “developed-nation-disease” 
medicines. The pharmaceutical industry spends much more on marketing and advertising. 
Further, the costs of producing an “innovative” medicine are unknown. Industry does not 
reveal marginal cost of production and only periodically reveals such data to “in-house” 
pharmaco-economists who appear to inflate the costs for lobbying purposes. Pharmaceutical 
company profits, after R&D costs have been removed, are conservatively estimated to be 
three to four times the profits of other US companies.132  
 Late in September 2004 eight major public health organisations and many of 
Australia’s most eminent public health experts signed an open letter to the leaders of both 
major Federal political parties. It called for Australia to place on record at the time of 
ratifying the AUSFTA a unilateral interpretive declaration over those ambiguities in its text 
                                                
132 R Laing B Waning, A Gray et al, 25 Years of WHO Essential Medicines List: Progress and Challenges 
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most likely to adversely effect the PBS and over which there was a clear difference of opinion 
between US and Australian authorities.133 
 Soon afterwards, the Australian parliament passed amendments to the AUSFTA 
implementing legislation designed to prevent the practice of brand name patent 
“evergreening” occurring under article 17.10.4. Given the context, this legislation can be 
regarded as being the equivalent of a unilateral interpretive declaration concerning the 
pharmaceutical provisions in the AUSFTA. The USTR representative reserved US rights over 
these amendments in the final exchange of letters over the AUSFTA. His Australian 
counterpart, in the same exchange of letters, acknowledged that a difference of opinion had 
arisen but that this was not significant enough to prevent the entire deal from proceeding.  
 Public pronouncements by the USTR suggest the US argument on the Australian anti-
evergreening legislation will be that it violates article 27.1 of TRIPS. This provides that patent 
rights shall be enjoyable “without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of 
technology and whether the products are imported or locally produced.”134 This is likely to be 
regarded as a spurious argument, however, as the Canada-Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceuticals Case decided that article 27.1 of TRIPS did not foreclose countries from 
providing reasonable and bona fide public interest exceptions to intellectual property 
protection problems that only exist in certain product areas. The problem of brand name drug 
patent “evergreening” certainly falls within this class. The US’ own version of anti-
evergreening legislation in its Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization 
Act 2003 would also have to be analysed in such an inquiry.  
 The parties’ primary and initial commitment in Annex 2C to “continued 
improvements in public health for their nationals” appears to have implicitly acknowledged 
the presence in the AUSFTA of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. This 
states, in part, “trade agreements should be interpreted and implemented to protect public 
health and promote universal access to medicines”.135 There are two reasons for this. First, the 
AUSFTA explicitly refers in Chapter 17 to the TRIPS convention.136 The Parties’ reference to 
“public health” in Annex 2C can therefore be presumed to have also included the most recent 
                                                
133 Open Letter to Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition Leading Health Experts Say Ambiguities in 
Trade Deal Put PBS at Risk 27 September 2004  
http://www.phaa.net.au/Media_Releases/OpenLetteronPBSandFTA.pdf [accessed 6 October 2004] 
134 Australia Poised to Pass US FTA with Controversial Drug Amendments 22(33) Inside US Trade 12 (2004. 
135 World Trade Organisation. 2001, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. 
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136 Chapter 17, footnote 15. 
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clarification of public health in the TRIPS agreement in existence at the time the AUSFTA 
was negotiated and ratified. Second, as a principle of construction, the articles of the 
AUSFTA cannot be presumed to have been entered in disobedience of the law of either Party. 
In this regard, section 2101(b)(4)(C) of the Trade Promotion Authority Act 2002 (US) 
required US negotiators to ensure that US trade agreements upheld the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health.  
 An intended consequence of PhRMA’s efforts however, may be that the AUSFTA 
pharmaceutical provisions open the door to a broader discussion by regulatory authorities in 
the US on the type of research necessary to establish that a pharmaceutical is truly innovative. 
A crucial part of such research will be the extent that a claim for pharmaceutical innovation 
under the AUSFTA requires proof (as required by the opening words of Annex 2C) of a 
medicine’s comparative affordability and objectively demonstrated therapeutic significance. 
The new joint Agency must be able to ensure that any new drug is of real public health value, 
but a decision not to list an “innovative” drug may result in cross-retaliation measures in other 
sectors. 
 If Pharmac’s fears are realised and the obligations on Australia under the AUSFTA 
flow on to New Zealand through the ANZTPA, the New Zealand may well have handed over, 
without seeking trade concessions, one of the major bargaining chips Australia had to obtain a 
trade agreement with the US.   
 One policy suggestion for the preservation of pharmaceutical cost-effectiveness 
regimes is to include these systems in bilateral and regional trade agreements.  The relevant 
provision (which could be particularly pertinent to trade deal discussions with China which 
has the world’s largest generic pharmaceutical market) would be to establish a Medicines 
Cost-Effectiveness Committee. A draft provision might be included after a discussion of 
quality and safety issues. It might read along these lines: 
 
 “Medicines Cost-Effectiveness Committee 
The Parties hereby establish a Medicines Cost-Effectiveness Committee, comprising  
relevant federal government officials and expert advisors, whose objective shall be to 
promote discussion and mutual understanding with a view to enhancing and 
developing techniques of and research related to cost-effectiveness pricing of 
pharmaceuticals.” 
 
No objection could be made that such a provision in any way breached TRIPS obligations as 
it is not related to intellectual property. 
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 Another policy suggestion is for medical schools to begin incorporating in the 
curricula, particularly in areas related to teaching evidence-based medicine, the techniques of 
cost-effectiveness pricing, including reference pricing as utilised by the PBAC process and 
tendering as implemented by Pharmac. This would ensure that the present accumulated 
wisdom of expert assessors flows on and is enhanced in the next generation. 
 The most important point to make here, however, is that Australia appears to have 
gained significant trade concessions in agriculture and manufacturing by conceding to US 
pharmaceutical industry demands  to include innovation principles (Annex 2C), the 
“evergreening” notification process (article 17.10.4) and the prohibition on parallel 
importation in article (17.9.4) in the AUSFTA. It makes little economic sense for New 
Zealand to give these bargaining chips away via the ANZTPA, particularly when the 
possibility of a trade deal with the US still exists. 
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